













analysis	 in	mainstream	scholarship	have	remained	relatively	stable	over	 the	 last	half	 century.	
Moreover,	they	have	not	evolved	in	proportion	to	the	development	of	the	field	at	large.	Valuable	
attention	 to	 rethinking	 the	 conceptual	 parameters	 of	 the	 field	 has	 come	 from	 contextual,	
historical,	 feminist	 or	 otherwise	 critical	 scholarship	 (Ashworth	 1991;	 Farmer	 2016;	 Fletcher	
1978;	 Loughnan	 2012;	 Naffine	 2009;	 Norrie	 2014;	 Wells	 and	 Quick	 2010);	 and—as	 the	
contributors	 to	 this	 fine	 essay	 note—from	 site‐specific	 areas	 of	 criminalisation.	 But,	 the	
conceptual	basis	 for	 theorisation	remains	a	pressing	concern.	This	 is	particularly	so	given	the	
recognition,	 in	much	 of	 the	most	 innovative	 recent	 scholarship,	 that	 the	 field	 of	 criminal	 law	
cannot	be	fully	understood	independent	of	the	dynamics	of	criminalisation	conceived	as	a	broad	
social	practice.	This	development	is	giving	a	new	spin	to	the	longstanding	focus	in	theoretically	




This	 turn	 to	criminalisation	 is	 to	be	welcomed,	yet	many	of	 the	 interpretive	arguments	about	
criminal	 law	 which	 it	 has	 generated—including,	 I	 should	 make	 clear,	 my	 own—depend	 on	
assumptions	about	patterns	of	criminalisation	which	it	is	not	clear	we,	as	yet,	have	the	conceptual	
tools	or	empirical	data	 to	 fully	substantiate.	This	really	came	home	to	me	about	a	decade	ago	
when	 I	was	 commissioned	 to	write	a	piece	on	criminalisation	 in	historical	perspective	 (Lacey	
2009).	When	 I	 asked	myself	 about	 the	detailed	basis	 for	 even	some	of	 the	most	widely	made	
claims	in	this	area—for	instance,	that	there	had	been	an	explosion	of	regulatory	criminalisation	




















understanding	patterns	 of	 criminalisation,	 yet	 tends	 to	 duck	 the	 question	of	 how,	 empirically	
and/or	conceptually,	we	can	track	those	patterns.	Important	initial	efforts	here	have	been	made,	
notably	 by	Andrew	Ashworth	 and	Meredith	Blake	 (1996)	 in	 a	pioneering	 essay	published	20	
years	ago,	and	more	recently	by	James	Chalmers	and	Fiona	Leverick	(Chalmers	2014;	Chalmers	
and	Leverick	2013).	But,	there	is	undoubtedly—as	the	authors	of	these	honourable	exceptions	
would	 doubtless	 attest—further	 progress	 to	 be	made.	 The	 modalities	 team	 are	 also	 right	 to	
suggest	that	the	accompanying	lack	of	reflexivity	in	the	field	tends	to	lead	to	both	a	skewed	view	
of	the	material	to	be	theorised,	and	an	over‐emphasis	on	the	headline	issue	of	so‐called	 ‘over‐







pairs	 of	 ways	 of	 thinking	 about	 criminalisation	 (Lacey	 2009,	 2016:	 Chapter	 1).	 First,	 we	 can	
distinguish	 between	 what	 we	 might	 call	 ‘formal	 criminalisation’—the	 full	 range	 of	 offences,	
whether	 created	 by	 statute	 or	 customary/common	 law,	 which	 are	 valid	 in	 a	 particular	 legal	
system	at	any	moment	in	time—and	‘substantive	criminalisation’—the	patterns	of	enforcement	





broader	 social,	 cultural,	 economic,	 emotional	 and	 political	 effects	 of	 those	 processes.	 No	 one	
project	 can,	 of	 course,	 hope	 to	 focus	 on	 each	 of	 these	 processes	 or	 practices	 at	 once;	 as	 the	
modalities	 team	 recognise,	 even	within	 any	one,	 over‐generalisation	 is	 a	 key	danger.	 But	 any	
project	dealing	with	one	half	of	either	pair	needs	to	be	aware	of	both	its	potentially	complex	and	
indirect	 relation	 with	 the	 other	 half,	 and	 with	 the	 other	 pair	 (formal	 for	 substantive	




The	 modalities	 team	 set	 out	 to	 provide	 a	 more	 differentiated	 conceptual	 scheme	 which	 can	
illuminate	the	realities	of	criminalisation,	which	is,	as	they	rightly	argue,	a	necessary	precursor	
to	 thinking	 clearly	 about	 how	 criminalisation	 should	 be	 used,	 normatively	 speaking.	 Their	
aspiration	is	‘to	have	a	better	understanding	of	why,	when	and	how	criminalisation	has	been	and	
is	the	chosen	policy	response	to	an	identified	harm	or	risk,	and	with	what	effects’	(McNamara	et	
al.	 in	 this	 issue:	 92).	 To	 this	 end,	 they	 differentiate	 four	 main	 modalities	 of	 criminalisation,	
distinguishing	 legislative	 provisions	 which	 expand,	 contract	 or	 rationalise	 the	 boundaries	 of	
criminalisation;	 or	 which	 criminalise,	 decriminalise	 or	 otherwise	 reshape	 criminalisation	 in	










include	 provisions	 which	 belong	 to	 more	 than	 one	 modality;	 nor,	 indeed,	 are	 classifications	
mutually	exclusive	(for	example,	a	provision	might	be	both	expansive	and	victim‐oriented).		
	
In	 terms	 of	 the	 classification	 scheme	 sketched	 above,	 the	modalities	 approach	 is	 accordingly	
concerned,	at	least	primarily,	not	so	much	with	substantive	criminalisation	and	the	outcomes	of	
criminalisation	 processes,	 but	 with	 formal	 criminalisation	 and	 with	 the	 varied	 processes	 of	
formal	 criminalisation.	 And,	 in	 terms	 of	 its	 power	 to	 accurately	 track	 and	 illuminate	 this	 key	
aspect	 of	 criminalisation,	 the	 modalities	 framework	 is	 a	 very	 significant	 advance.	 For,	
notwithstanding	its	focus	on	legislative	change,	its	scheme	for	tracking	that	change	ensures	that	
it	 is	picking	up	on	a	range	of	 formal	changes—notably	procedural	and	punitive,	pre‐and	post‐
conviction—which	 are	 likely	 (though	 not	 certainly)	 to	 have	 material	 effects	 on	 substantive	
criminalisation,	 and	 which,	 hence,	 equip	 the	 field	 to	 coordinate	 research	 on	 formal	 and	
substantive	criminalisation	in	a	much	more	satisfactory	way	than	has	until	now	been	possible.	
We	 might	 say	 that	 the	 modalities	 approach	 conceptualises	 criminalisation	 in	 a	 way	 which	
matches	 the	aspirations	of	 texts	such	as	Bronitt	and	McSherry	 (2017),	Brown	et	al.	 (2015)	or	
Wells	and	Quick	(2010)—or	that	is	reflected	in	Ashworth’s	heroic	work	in	producing	over	many	
years	three	texts	covering	the	criminal	process,	criminal	law	and	sentencing	(Ashworth’s	single	







many	scholars	have	 long	 felt	 to	be	an	unsatisfactory	marginalisation	of	 regulatory	norms	and	
procedural	issues	in	criminal	law	scholarship.	And	the	authors’	own	identification	of	a	trend,	in	
















motivations,	 ones	which	 systematically	 drive	 the	 deployment	 of	 criminalising	 power,	 equally	






Second,	while	 the	 range	 of	 sub‐modalities	 and	 the	 practice	 of	 allowing	 a	 single	 statute	 to	 be	
counted	in	more	than	one	modality	and	sub‐modality	is	a	huge	advance	in	terms	of	capturing	the	
details	 of	 trends	 in	 a	 conceptually	 manageable,	 indeed,	 elegant	 way,	 this	 method	 cannot,	




























distinctively	 and	 helpfully	 broad	 and	 differentiated	way.	 But,	 in	 light	 of	 the	 key	 relevance	 of	
substantive	criminalisation	and	of	criminalisation	as	a	social	outcome,	to	socio‐legal	studies	and	







substantial	 step	 in—as	 well	 as	 the	 cornerstone	 of—a	 broader	 project	 which	 articulates	 the	







existing	 literature	 which	 advances	 general	 theses	 about	 the	 why	 and	 the	 with	 what	 effect:	
whether	 these	 be	 claims	 about	 the	move	 to	 risk	 prevention,	 a	 resurgence	 of	 character‐based	
criminalisation,	 an	 ‘insecurity	 state’,	 ‘governing	 through	crime’,	or	 a	 return	 to	 the	 ‘punishable	
subject’	(Ashworth	and	Zedner	2014;	Farmer	2016;	Lacey	2016;	Ramsay	2012;	Simon	2007).	This	
could	 offer	 a	 more	 nuanced	 frame	 for	 assessing	 the	 scale,	 speed	 and	 importance	 of	 the	
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